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Re-evaluation of British and French Women’s Access to Citizenship
–From the Perspective of Two Distinct Notions of Liberty–
Chinatsu Takeda
How did women obtain citizenship in Europe?1) The historical assessment of 
British and French women’s access to citizenship indicates a contradictory pattern. On 
the one hand, by the end of the nineteenth century, British women obtained certain civil 
rights whereas their French counter-parts obtained them during the 1960s: they included 
women’s right to divorce, dispose of their personal fortunes as well as children. On the 
other hand, the pattern reversed with regards to social citizenship: according to the 1945 
post-war settlement of the welfare system, French married women were attributed full 
social citizenship as wage earners whereas British married women’s economic liberty was 
restricted and were given only dependent status as part of a family unit headed by their 
husbands.
Why was women’s access to civil, political and social citizenship asymmetrical 
between Britain and France? Why did the British favour civil and political aspects of 
citizenship whereas the French lay emphasis upon social aspects? This essay will trace 
them back to the differences of national political cultures in order to account for the 
paradoxical historical pattern in terms of women’s access to citizenship between Britain 
and France.2) In particular, I will demonstrate that conﬂicting notions of ‘liberty’ in the 
British and French political cultures in the nineteenth and a large portion of the twentieth 
centuries resulted in their different assumptions concerning the relationship between the 
two sexes as well as role of women in the state. 
An essential difference between British and French political traditions derives 
from their conﬂicting notions of ‘liberty’.3)
The British liberal tradition from the seventeenth-century onward forwarded 
the notion of individual liberty as personal freedom away from state influence. As a 
representative theorist of natural rights, John Locke attributed the ultimate meaning of 
liberty to the freedom of thought and affirmed that the state exerted a political but not 
spiritual authority upon individuals.4) Liberty inherent to the British political culture thus 
supposed a limited authority of the state and the existence of the ‘private sphere’.5) At the 
same time, Locke sanctioned individuals’ natural rights to property and linked political 
rights with property conditions. According to him, women were ascribed to the domestic 
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sphere, a part of the private sphere where the state was not allowed to intervene.
In contrast, Rousseau considered civil liberty in terms of individuals’ ‘liberty’ 
to participate in the general will. From this perspective, Rousseau dissociated the right 
to political participation from property conditions against Locke. Under Rousseau’s 
ideological inﬂuence, the post-Revolutionary French political culture tended to posit that 
liberty of individuals was possible only within the ideological inﬂuence of the state.6)
It implied that contrary to Britain, post-Revolutionary French political culture 
denied the split between the public and private spheres and aspired to reconcile individual 
rights and rights of the state and to overcome the antinomy between civil society and the 
political authority.7) It supposed a right superior to the individual natural right, the social 
right which could only guarantee individual rights by showing that individual rights in fact 
expressed a duty of solidarity.8)
Differences concerning the definition of liberty and the relationship between 
individuals and the state substantially influenced the perception of women as well as 
their role in the state in the respective national political cultures. I shall explain such a 
correlation from a philosophical and ideological as well as practical perspective and refer 
briefly to the essential differences between Locke and Rousseau’s visions of women, 
the legislature upon women as well as the historical origin of the feminist movement in 
nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain and France. 
Firstly, as Enlightenment thinkers, both Locke and Rousseau thought that women’s 
role was ascribed to the domestic sphere.9) However, some essential differences are 
perceptible between these two representative Enlightenment thinkers. Firstly, as some 
feminist historians suggested, it is possible to recognise the ideological root of feminism in 
Locke’s political thought. He assumed that as individuals, women were also accessible to 
reason by way of education contrary to Rousseau who assumed that women were naturally 
devoid of any rational capacity and therefore there was no need to educate them.10)
Secondly, Locke recognised that marriage was also a social contract like other 
political organisations. Nevertheless, he also thought that wives should obey their 
husbands because the law of majority would not be applicable to the dispute in the 
household in line with an overwhelming empirical reality of his time.11) His ambiguous 
attitude towards marriage matched with women’s social status in nineteenth-century 
Britain; women were attributed a dependent legal status upon their husbands and allocated 
to the private sphere, that was, a non-political sphere of the family headed by the husband.
In contrast, although Rousseau considered that women’s ‘natural’ role was to obey 
their husbands and nurture their children within the family unit, his perception of women 
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in political order differed from that of Locke12): The ideological influence of the state 
was allowed to permeate the public as well as private spheres as a result of the collective 
appropriation of the political authority. As a result, French women were politicised within 
the sphere of family as citoyennes contrary to ‘private’ British women.  In other words, 
the family was directly exposed to the state intervention in France contrary to Britain. 
These essential differences correlated with legislative practices of nineteenth-
century Britain and France. The most salient example of these was that unlike the British 
common laws, the French Civil Code directly regulated sexual conducts as a pragmatic 
means to maintain political order.13) While English Common laws did not mention 
adultery considering that it belonged to the private sphere, the Civil Code considered 
wives’ adultery as a crime without questioning that of husbands. Moreover, the Civil Code 
prohibited lawsuits against a paternal parent for the custody of illegitimate children until 
1913. 
These subtle but substantial differences concerning the notion of liberty and the 
relation of women to the state were reflected in the historical development of feminist 
movements as well. It is true that there were diverse political and ideological contents 
among nineteenth-century British feminist movements. Nevertheless, as domestic 
feminists, the first generation feminists claimed ‘negative liberty’ and underscored the 
aspiration to emancipate women from her restrictive juridical status within the family.14) 
Early British feminists thus aimed at rectifying injustices of the common law concerning 
the relationship between the husband and the wife and asked that married women be given 
equal legal status with their partners in the family. They never demanded further social 
and economic change of society nor questioned industrial capitalism that contributed to 
such an unequal relationship between the two spouses. 
In contrast, French feminism started during the 1830s among a narrow circle of 
early socialists.15) Nonetheless, it was not until the 1890s that French feminism became 
crystallized as a political force in public opinion. In the face of an alarming dénatalité and 
mounting threat from Germany, French feminists at the turn of the century focused upon 
motherhood as a common bond among all women and as a strategy for claiming their 
political integration into the French nation. 
Despite the difference in terms of political etiquettes carried by feminists such as 
social Catholics, communists and republicans, French feminists of the late nineteenth-
century and early twentieth century underlined ‘positive liberty’ of women in the sense 
that they positively demanded state intervention to improve women’s situation as wives, 
mothers and single women contrary to the British feminist movement.16) In this context, 
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the Anglo-American feminism that claimed women’s natural rights equal to men within 
the family seemed ‘selfish’ to those French feminists who were ready to sacrifice their 
personal cause to the good of their nation in the era of nationalism.
In line with the two distinct tendencies in terms of political culture, liberty, and 
feminist movements in Britain and France, women’s juridical status within the family 
was reformed in Britain earlier than France. An act of 1857 had made it possible for a 
civil court to grant divorce even if the only grounds were adultery. Although all a wife’s 
property passed into the ownership of her husband at marriage and she had no legal right 
to acquire or own property while married until 1857, a divorced wife gained the right to 
keep property and earnings from this year. In 1882, the Married Women’s Property Act 
allowed them to retain ownership and control of earnings, property, inheritance and gifts. 
This act was symbolic in that it first recognised women’s natural right to property, an 
essential component of liberty in the British political tradition. Finally, the equality of men 
and women vis à vis children was introduced by the legislation of 1886 and 1925. 
In contrast, since 1804, the Civil Code had attributed full-ﬂedged citizenship only 
to the pater familias and conﬁned married women and children to the status of minors. 
However, French women’s unequal juridical status within the family persisted well beyond 
1945. As the chief of the family, husbands continuously disposed of a considerable power 
over the person and fortune of their wives. It was exclusively up to them to determine 
the place of residence of the household, authorise their women to work, administer their 
fortunes as well as those of their wives not to mention their right to divorce, property and 
children.17)
A real ‘decolonisation’ of French married women’ s subordinate status vis à vis 
their husbands took place during the 1960s: They were entitled to open their own bank 
accounts without the signature of their husbands in 1965.18) Legal incapacity and patria 
potesta (attributing power to husbands over wives and fathers over children) were replaced 
by the parental authority in 1970.19) They obtained the right to divorce by mutual consent 
in 1975. Finally, a complete equality of spouses in management of family property was 
established only in 1985.20)
I have shown that the British married women obtained certain civil rights equal 
to their husbands and eventually gained personal freedom and control over their person, 
property and children by the end of the nineteenth century. The grant of these civil rights 
particularly favoured those wealthy middle-class women who already disposed of a certain 
amount of fortune before marriage. In contrast, the same civil rights were attributed to the 
French married women almost a hundred years later only after the patriarchal concept of 
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the family had been reformed during the 1960s. 
 
However, the pattern reversed as far as women’s right to work was concerned: 
With the advent of the welfare state in 1945, French married women were given full social 
citizenship as wage earners while their British counter-parts were attributed a dependent 
status as part of a family unit. In the latter part of this essay, I shall account for such a 
paradox by looking into their national political cultures and their conﬂicting notions of 
liberty, again. In particular, I will emphasise that different perceptions of the role of the 
state in economy and sexual politics that corresponded to the two definitions of liberty 
contributed to determine married women’s conﬂicting status to social citizenship in both 
countries in 1945.
The end of the Second World War constituted a historical break all over Western 
Europe. People’s aspiration to reconstruct society on a new basis led to a rise of a new 
ideology on the political agenda: social justice. In this context, the welfare state was 
established by the British labour government as well as the French conseil national de la 
Résistance, a coalition of major political parties which resisted the German occupation 
and was led by the general de Gaulle. The welfare state can be understood as an inter-
connected set of social programs designed to alleviate consequences of unstable economic 
cycles and personal life such as poverty, sickness, unemployment and the old age.
A growing interest in equality as a principle of social justice required, in addition 
to pre-existing civil and political rights, a new category of citizenship endowed with social 
rights. Social citizenship can be deﬁned as the whole range from the right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and 
to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society.21) For 
the architects of the state welfare systems, social citizenship was usually thought to derive 
from the universal condition of waged work and the wage earner was considered to be the 
model citizen.22)
The social security system was therefore an interaction between citizens as 
taxpayers and the state as the re-distributor of wealth. The welfare state aimed at social 
justice through the working of economic policies that ultimately depended upon political 
decisions. From the perspective of the state, this meant that the welfare state was required 
to intervene in economy in one way or another but its degree of intervention depended 
upon the national political cultures. Thus, women’s status to social citizenship partially 
resulted from economic policies adopted by the two countries immediately after the end of 
the Second World War. 
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British policy makers gave priority to full-employment through the Keynesian 
management of demand. The Conservative party as well as the Labour party accepted 
Keynesianism in order to achieve a social consensus which would combine full-
employment claimed by the trade union and the private property of means of production 
and free market principles as were demanded by employers.23) This economic choice 
was therefore limited to temporary solutions and did not involve any structural economic 
change.24)
This minimalist intervention in the nation’s economic life reflected the British 
liberal tradition according to which economic activities as a part of the private sphere 
should be left to the principle of laisser-faire. In other words, this economic choice meant 
the preservation of social status, solving the question of redistribution of wealth through 
macro-economic policies of full-employment. Trade unions were anxious to maintain their 
power and independence as defenders of interests of workers but did not support further 
state intervention to restructure economy in line with employers.25)
From women’s point of view, this economic choice made by male policy makers 
implied that gender relations based upon the distinction between the public and private 
spheres remained unchanged: both the Labour party and the trade unions thought that the 
maintenance of traditional family, that is, a working man and a non-wage earning mother 
with children, was a major goal.26) The trade unions concerned with the preservation of an 
exclusively male membership were hostile towards women who wanted to work because 
they thought that women might threaten men’s jobs and wages. As a result the labour 
movement had a conservative attitude towards women similar to their employers. Finally, 
a large majority of women sanctioned this sexual division of labour by voting massively 
in favour of the Labour government in 1945.27)
As a result, since the family wage principle was not challenged, the state decided 
that wives gained access to the system of state welfare through their husbands although 
the state also decided to pay family allowances to all mothers for child support.28) This 
perception led to British women’s distinctive status with regards to social citizenship 
within the post-war settlement. Firstly, the wife was treated as an economic dependent 
of her husband. Secondly, if she chose to work, she would receive lower beneﬁts than a 
single woman.29) Thirdly, married women were encouraged in their dependency upon part-
time work, a phenomenon that holds true today, as well. In short, British married women 
were considered as secondary citizens in terms of social citizenship in 1945.30)
In contrast, the economic reform went further in France than Britain after 1945. 
In terms of macro-economic policies, the priority was given to investment as well as 
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economic growth at the expense of inﬂation.31) It is needless to say that such an economic 
choice was more likely to stimulate economic growth than full-employment adopted 
by the British Labour government within the post-war context of an internationally 
favourable economic context.32) Also, it must be emphasised that French economy was 
much more backward than the British one in terms of degrees of industrialisation by then. 
Such a social tide was also encouraged by the immediate political circumstances: 
unlike the United Kingdom, employers were largely discredited because of the 
collaboration with the Nazis regime. This also explains why employers were hardly 
represented in the C.N.R. (Conseil national de la Résistance). In this context, socialists 
and communists supported the nation’s active role in economy and led to the realisation of 
the planned economy. The planned economy, a central element during the thirty years of 
high economic growth after the war (les Trentes Glorieuses), was supported by a particular 
relationship between the state and society as I mentioned earlier.33) It implied that the 
state, as a coherent entity, located above society and therefore not directly constrained 
by demands of particular social actors, had an authoritative capacity to talk in the name 
of the general interest. As such, the state was capable of destroying the pre-existing 
uncompetitive industries for the beneﬁt of creating new ones.34)
French women were incorporated into this overall reform of economy that required 
a global change in social relations.35) Male policy makers recognised that a dynamic 
economic system depended upon women wage earners. Employers understood that 
women’s labour force was necessary to boost economy. The French left believed that only 
when women became wage earners would they support the struggle for socialism.36)  The 
Communist party, in particular, tried throughout the inter-war years to organise women 
into trade unions and political parties.37) Unlike British Trade Unions, French unionists 
assumed many women worked and therefore attacked employers’ power from a position of 
male and female solidarity.38) These open attitudes towards women’s work resulted in the 
constitution of the Fourth Republic that guaranteed all French citizens the right to work.39)
As a result, in post-war France, all women, no matter what their marital status, 
gained equal social rights with their male counter-parts in the social security system as 
soon as they became wage earners.40) Paid maternity leave and other pre- and post- natal 
protection were included in them.41) Such a treatment contrasts sharply with the British 
social security system which differed treatments depending upon women’s marital status: 
Women were treated as independent workers if single, and as dependent if married. In the 
case of women with children and without men, they were assigned a status arbitrarily.42)
Furthermore, the CNR passed legislation in which women were given the right 
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to equal access to civil service jobs and the right to equal pay for equal work in contrast 
to the British government which refused in 1947 to implement the principle of equal pay 
for women in the public sector.43) From the perspective of gender relations, the general 
recognition that women’s workforce was necessary to boost French economy contributed 
to women’s access to full-ﬂedged social citizenship. Thus, the state as an arbitrary power 
justiﬁed a progressive social reorganisation of gender relations in post-war France contrary 
to Britain. 
Finally, in addition to reasons pertaining to the nation’s economic, social and 
political policies, conflicting attitudes towards sexuality in France and Britain might 
also account for men’s different attitudes concerning women’s right to work from a 
psychological point of view. 
With regards to sexual politics, Rousseau schematically explained that two distinct 
male attitudes towards sexuality determined their sociability with women.44) The one was 
to assume that individuals with their bodily differences were social beings whose personal 
happiness depended upon mutual dependence with the other sex through heterosexual 
love. From this perspective, men and women could achieve freedom through sexuality 
since from sexuality, they could learn to co-operate with each other without exploiting the 
other.45)
However, at the same time, Rousseau wondered whether men were better off by 
not entering into sexual relationships with women because they had a real choice women 
did not possess, whose sociability was controlled by their reproductive function.46) The 
fear and admiration for women’s power over men thus led to his second idea: happiness 
could be obtained if men had lived in an individualistic condition of independent self-
sufficiency. In this light, radical freedom could be achieved only by transcending the 
natural difference between the two sexes.47) In other words, the second idea posited that 
because freedom and dependence were by definition incompatible, freedom could be 
gained only by those men who were able to achieve freedom from sexual dependence.  
From the point of view of gender relations, it is possible to assume that these 
two ideas about individuals and gender relations underlay male policy-makers’ attitudes 
concerning the post-war welfare settlement in Britain and France.  
On the one hand, the concept of natural sociability inherent to the French 
Republican tradition placed heterosexual love at the heart of couples’ relationship: Since 
bodily differences destine men and women to be mutually dependent, love was a source 
of freedom to become a free-person. Inequality between men and women entailed equality 
which took into account the sexual difference. It seems that such a vision of the sexual 
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difference based upon the physical traits and their national passion for romantic love made 
French men more open to women’s participation in work life in 1945.48) They did not feel 
threatened by the confusion of the two sexes in the household that women’s work might 
entail because it would not affect their basic political premise according to which men and 
women were fundamentally different and mutually dependent through love. Indeed, this 
was the other side of women’s inferior juridical status in the household. 
In contrast, according to the British liberal tradition, an individual was seen above 
all as an asexual person whose freedom was based upon the notion of self-sufficiency. 
The British political culture based more upon the notion of individual rather than a 
couple created a certain tension within the household when it came to women’s economic 
independence. In this respect, as feminist historians pointed out, within the British 
political culture since the nineteenth-century, sexual difference had been more likely to be 
preserved in political terms between freedom (men) and subordination (women) within the 
marriage. 
Pateman called the nineteenth-century marriage in Britain a sexual contract since 
husbands had an unquestionable access to wives’ bodies.49) In addition, I suggest that 
the gendered nature of ‘the private initiative’, the core notion of economic liberty that 
in fact was permitted exclusively to white ‘middle-class’ men also served to preserve a 
hierarchical relationship in the household. This is why women’s work was likely to be 
more threatening to British men than their French counter-part since women’s equality 
with men in terms of economic liberty would eventually eliminate the sexual difference 
within the category of an abstract individual, resulting in a relative loss in male freedom 
within the family. From this point of view, the ‘possession’ of women rather than 
‘dependence’ upon them was presumably more reassuring to British men who were afraid 
that sexuality might deprive them of freedom, contrary to French men to whom sexuality 
was an essential component to freedom. Within an individual-based society, economic 
freedom of women thus ran the risk of a head-on confrontation between the two sexes in 
the market economy, which was likely to provoke the ‘war between the couple’ within the 
household. 
For these various reasons, the status quo of gender division of labour between the 
public and private spheres in post-war Britain reﬂected the long-standing tradition inherent 
to the liberal political culture. The sexual politics characterized by the principle of separate 
spheres served to countenance state intervention in the market and to make sure that the 
state interference with the private sphere was to be as minimal as possible lest it overturn 
the established economic and political freedoms of capitalism.50)
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As a result, the Victorian family model was carried on to the post-war period 
and the middle-class family model with its bread-winning father and dependent wife 
who performed the domestic labour was thought to ensure public and private stability. 
The ideal motherhood would require ‘full-time motherhood’ and women’s work outside 
the household stood condemned as likely to produce family problems such as juvenile 
crimes.51) In addition, ideas about the centrality of the mother-child relationship within the 
household led to the closure of nurseries in post-war years.52) Finally, to sanction such a 
gender status quo, the British government recognised mothers’ unpaid work by directly 
paying them the family allowances to women. Although it helped married women’s 
economic life, such a system also served to sanction the widespread assumption that 
caring for children was women’s work.  
In contrast, because of the very lack of the notion of privacy, all children of French 
women whether they were legally married wives or single mothers were considered 
children of the Republic and entitled to the same opportunities in life.53) From this 
perspective, the French government was willing to support all working mothers’ double 
life of work and children whatever their marital status through various social services. 
Above all, family allowances aimed at the welfare of children were considered a pillar 
of the welfare system as compared with medical care and unemployment in the British 
welfare system.54) In addition, like in Britain, mothers directly received maternity 
allowances, as well. Finally, French policy makers also enacted programs to cover the 
child-care expenses of working mothers and expand state child-care facilities.55)
Consequently, in the name of the general interest (increase in population and 
expansion of economy), the state intervened in family affairs in France where the British 
government did not and radically changed gender relations in terms of economic liberty. In 
this light, the state intervention was meant to increase a possible choice of having children 
for working mothers while taking advantage of female work force to sustain a high rate of 
economic growth. 
Conclusion
Alain Touraine featured the irreconcilable difference of English and French 
democracies as follows: the former attributed vital importance to a limited authority 
of the state by the law and recognition of fundamental human rights, which resulted in 
a limited representation of those who govern and a protection of social and economic 
interests of individuals against an arbitrary power.56) The latter insists upon a socially wide 
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representation of those who govern, and considers that democracy which defends interests 
of people in opposition to the oligarchy or the monarchy would be the best.
It is needless to say that his hypothesis concerning the two distinct democracies 
were most applicable to the nineteenth century when the universal suffrage was far from 
common either for men or women across Europe. His statement with regards to the right 
to vote was therefore less relevant in the historical context of the early twentieth-century 
when the universal suffrage for women was introduced in many parts of Western Europe. 
Nevertheless, this essay demonstrates that Touraine’s idea that France privileges 
democracy to defend interests of people was clearly sanctioned by French women’s access 
to social citizenship in 1945 whereas even in 1945 the British case gave priority to the 
protection of pre-existing social and economic interests of individuals over the extension 
of social beneﬁts to a larger number of population from the point of view of economic 
liberty. 
A hundred years’ gap between Britain and France in terms of women’s access to 
certain civil rights in the household might result from their conﬂicting national political 
cultures as well. These rights were better ﬁt in with the notion of negative liberty inherent 
to the British political culture whereas they contradicted with the gendered nature of 
positive liberty that characterised the French political culture. In particular, the analysis 
demonstrates that some gender bias inherent to the French political culture observable in 
Rousseau’s political thought and the French democratic traditions since 1789 persisted 
well after French women obtained the voting right in 1945.
The analysis of the historical evolution of women’s citizenship between the 
nineteenth-century and the 1960s in Britain and France therefore confirms conflicting 
national patterns of democracy. Consequently, it is fair to assume that the French political 
model would tend to provide a greater number of women a possibility of combining work 
and family in contrast with the Britain model which would give only high-income working 
women private financial means to sustain family life while prompting less qualified 
women to become full-time housewives or work as a part-timer. 
At the same time, women’s access to citizenship and its social rights in particular 
are far from established since they are forcibly constrained by the historical circumstances. 
In this respect, women’s massive entry into the labour market in France in 1945 should be 
relocated within a concrete social, economic, and political post-war context that favoured 
demand-oriented economic policies. 
Finally, although the French government designed social policies based upon 
the assumption that women worked, it did not override other social customs such as 
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the subordination of women to men within the household and men’s indifference to the 
household duties. In this sense, women’s subordination to men was still a common feature 
in France and the United Kingdom in the immediate post-war period. 
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